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I. INTRODUCTION 
The Internet raises several challenges for privacy law. In particular it often 
disrupts laws that regulate specific industries. As prior scholarship has shown, in-
dustry-specific laws are prone to circumvention and obsolescence whenever firms 
outside the covered industry begin collecting and using the same sorts of data.1 And 
the rapid birth (and death) of online business models makes these sorts of disrup-
tions increasingly common.2 The resulting scheme is one that has sustained sub-
stantial criticism for drawing arbitrary distinctions between entities collecting the 
same sorts of personal information.3 
This essay argues that the distinct features of online commerce not only chal-
lenge discrete industry-specific laws, but also expose more fundamental difficulties 
for the industry-specific approach. The piecemeal enactment of laws regulating 
                                                          
 
 * Ph.D. Candidate in Law, Yale University, and Resident Fellow at the Yale Information So-
ciety Project. J.D. 2010, Yale Law School. I would like to thank Kiel Brennan-Marquez, Lauren Henry, 
Christine Jolls, Margot Kaminski, David Medine, Bilyana Petkova, Sofia Ranchordás, Yana Welinder, and 
my colleagues at the Yale Information Society Project for invaluable feedback on this project, as well as the 
participants at the 2015 Idaho Law Review Symposium on Privacy in the Age of Pervasive Surveillance. 
Responsibility for any loopholes or obsolescence rests with the author. 
 1. See, e.g., Paul M. Schwartz, Preemption and Privacy, 118 YALE L.J. 902, 923–25 (2009) 
(describing the challenges that telecommunications convergence poses for laws premised on stable divi-
sions between types of broadcasters or platforms). Technology-specific laws face comparable challenges 
when firms use non-covered technologies to collect the sorts of data the laws are meant to protect. See, e.g., 
Michael Birnhack, Reverse Engineering Informational Privacy Law, 15 YALE J.L. & TECH. 24, 38–42 
(2012) (arguing that flexibility is one of the main advantages that legislators seek through technology-
neutral privacy laws).  
 2. See Part II.A, infra. 
 3. Kenneth A. Bamberger & Deirdre K. Mulligan, Privacy on the Books and on the Ground, 63 
STAN. L. REV. 247, 257 (2011) (articulating this position as the prevailing critique of U.S. privacy statutes). 
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specific industries may have been effective in a time when lawmakers could identi-
fy all the industries involved in a particular data-collection practice and trust that 
new industries would not soon enter the same niche. Indeed, when the business 
landscape is stable, this approach may offer advantages insofar as it allows law-
makers to tailor their interventions to the specific incentives and norms of the regu-
lated industries. But the information age creates at least three complications for 
industry-specific lawmaking.4 First, the accelerated rate of entry that characterizes 
online commerce makes it hard for legislators to keep pace on an industry-by-
industry basis. Second, the intermediation of online transactions by third parties—
parties ranging from Internet service providers to search engines, advertising net-
works, and financial institutions—exposes gaps in any intervention that targets only 
the industry itself without accounting for these intermediaries.5 And third, the rela-
tive obscurity of online surveillance makes it difficult for lawmakers to identify and 
target the right class of entities through the industry-specific paradigm. Neither 
legislators nor their constituents are well equipped to deal with surveillance prac-
tices that are invisible to them. 
The argument proceeds in three parts. Part I demonstrates the limits of indus-
try-specific privacy laws and lawmaking by reference to the regulation of “book 
services” under the California Reader Privacy Act of 2011 (“CRPA”)6 and “finan-
cial institutions” under the Financial Privacy Rule of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act 
(“GLBA”).7 Part II explains in greater detail why rapid turnover, dense intermedia-
tion, and lack of transparency render the industry-specific approach untenable for 
regulating commerce online. Part III explores three possibilities for responding to 
these challenges: (1) moving from industry-specific privacy laws to more transac-
tion-centered approaches; (2) making contemporary data-collection practices more 
transparent, and thereby more amenable to regulation; and (3) looking beyond 
Congress to consider the role that more agile bodies like administrative agencies or 
state lawmakers play in responding to changes in technology and business methods. 
II. INDUSTRY-SPECIFIC PRIVACY LAWS 
The following examples illustrate the coverage problems that undermine in-
dustry-specific laws as business models change. The CRPA fails to protect the very 
digital reading records it was meant to cover because its definition of “book ser-
vices” is too narrow. Besides overlooking common intermediaries like Internet ser-
vice providers, the Act seems to exclude Google Books and other services that are 
                                                          
 
 4. See Part II, infra. 
 5. This understanding of the shortcomings in industry-specific privacy laws—that they fail to 
regulate intermediaries and interlopers despite their entanglement with the covered entity—treads common 
ground with Anita Krug’s critique of entity-centric financial regulations. See generally Anita K. Krug, 
Escaping Entity-Centrism in Financial Services Regulation, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 2039 (2013). Krug argues 
that entity-centric regulations, which regulate financial firms as though they were standalone entities, can-
not achieve their purposes without also speaking to the complex web of affiliates, parent companies, or 
subsidiaries instrumental to a firm’s operations. See id. at 2043–44. 
 6. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1798.90–1798.90.05 (West 2012). 
 7. 15 U.S.C. §§ 68016809 (2012). 
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funded by advertising. The GLBA’s Financial Privacy Rule encountered similar 
functional obsolescence almost as soon as it passed. While Congress attempted to 
protect consumers’ financial information by regulating “financial institutions,” ad-
vances in computing power delivered retailers the tools to assemble detailed con-
sumer dossiers without the banks’ assistance. 
A. California Reader Privacy Act 
Industry-specific limitations can render laws obsolete even in the regulation 
of the very activities for which they are designed. Consider library confidentiality 
laws. Following the conventional critique of our piecemeal approach to privacy 
law, one might argue that these laws are defective in protecting reader privacy to 
the extent they draw arbitrary lines in the treatment of libraries, bookstores, and 
online databases.8 But the laws now face a more fundamental problem. They fail to 
protect records that arise from library activity itself unless they cover the various 
cloud-computing platforms, e-book providers, and other intermediaries that have 
become integral to the delivery of library services.9 
The CRPA repeats the same mistakes. California enacted the law to cover 
booksellers with privacy protections like those that already cover libraries and vid-
eo stores.10 The Act’s sponsors were specifically concerned with protecting privacy 
in the face of changing reading habits, particularly the adoption of e-books.11 Not-
withstanding the drafters’ intent to address the challenges of the digital medium, 
the CRPA’s industry-specific limits undermine its ability to cover emergent prac-
tices in the distribution of digital books. 
The Act only regulates disclosures by a “book service,” defined as “a service 
that, as its primary purpose, provides the rental, purchase, borrowing, browsing, or 
viewing of books.”12 The definition further excludes stores where book service 
sales “do not exceed 2 percent of the store’s total annual gross sales of consumer 
products sold in the United States.”13 One gap in coverage therefore arises when a 
book provider funds itself by means other than the sale of books. No one sells more 
                                                          
 
 8. Cf. Anne Klinefelter, Library Standards for Privacy: A Model for the Digital World?, 11 
N.C. J.L. & TECH. 553, 561 (2010) (arguing for the extension of library privacy laws to these contexts). For 
background reading on the importance of reader privacy, see generally Marc Jonathan Blitz, Constitutional 
Safeguards for Silent Experiments in Living: Libraries, the Right To Read, and a First Amendment Theory 
for an Unaccompanied Right To Receive Information, 74 UMKC L. REV. 799 (2006); Julie E. Cohen, A 
Right To Read Anonymously: A Closer Look at “Copyright Management” in Cyberspace, 28 CONN. L. 
REV. 981 (1996); and Neil M. Richards, Intellectual Privacy, 87 TEX. L. REV. 387 (2008). 
 9. See generally BJ Ard, Confidentiality and the Problem of Third Parties: Protecting Reader 
Privacy in the Age of Intermediaries, 16 YALE J.L. & TECH. 1 (2013) (exploring the library confidentiality 
regime’s difficulties regulating non-librarian third parties like Amazon when they deliver library services); 
Michael Zimmer, Patron Privacy in the “2.0” Era: Avoiding the Faustian Bargain of Library 2.0, 22 J. 
INFO. ETHICS 44 (2013) (examining the challenges that Web 2.0 technologies pose for librarians’ privacy 
commitments). 
 10. See CAL. S. REP. S.B. 602, 2011 WL 1364760, at 8 (2011) (Comm. Rep.).  
 11. See id. at 1–3. 
 12. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.90(b)(2) (West 2012). 
 13. Id. Relatedly, the law restricts its scope to “commercial entities” that provide book services. 
Id. § 1798.90(b)(6). 
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books online—electronically or in hardcopy—than Amazon.14 Yet book sales rep-
resent only a fraction of its total business: books accounted for 7 percent of Ama-
zon’s revenues last year.15 One can imagine a future where Amazon so diversified 
its business that it moved beyond the reach of the statute. Google—which provides 
millions of users with limited unpaid access to books via its Google Books service 
and sells books on Google Play alongside apps and other media—already appears 
to fall short of the 2 percent threshold.16 
It would not be surprising, moreover, if a future book service went further 
than Google Books in giving books away for “free.” Many online services—take 
Spotify17—now provide access to digital media without charging the user and make 
money through some combination of advertisement and monetization of user data.18 
A book service that made its money off advertisements rather than by charging for 
books could colorably argue that the statute did not apply to its activities. Unfortu-
nately for California readers, this could mean that the businesses most interested in 
the trafficking of user data were not subject to the CRPA. 
Even if California were to iron out the wrinkles in its definition of book ser-
vice, the CRPA would still provide little protection against digital intermediaries 
and eavesdroppers. The Act operates by limiting the book service’s ability to dis-
close reading records to third parties. It does not address the possibility that third 
parties might collect users’ reading records directly without need for such disclo-
sure. Some of these third parties might learn our reading preferences in the course 
of facilitating our online transactions. Internet Service Providers (“ISPs”), for ex-
ample, would know which books we browsed at Amazon or Project Gutenberg un-
less those pages were encrypted.19 And while we might purchase a book at the cor-
ner store using cash, few people pay anonymously online. This means that our 
credit card providers—or online alternatives like PayPal or Google Wallet—are 
also privy to our book purchases. 
                                                          
 
 14. See Polly Mosendz, Amazon Has Basically No Competition Among Online Booksellers, THE 
WIRE (May 30, 2014, 2:44 PM), http://www.thewire.com/business/2014/05/amazon-has-basically-no-
competition-among-online-booksellers/371917/. 
 15. Jeff Bercovici, Amazon vs. Book Publishers, By the Numbers, FORBES (Feb. 10, 2014, 2:49 
PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/jeffbercovici/2014/02/10/amazon-vs-book-publishers-by-the-numbers/. 
 16. Financial coverage from last year suggests that Google Play makes up 10 percent or less of 
Google’s total revenue. Steve Symington, How Google Play Is Serving Up Stunning Growth, MOTLEY 
FOOL (June 26, 2014), http://www.fool.com/investing/general/2014/06/26/googles-latest-growth-driver-is-
just-getting-start.aspx. The same analysis suggests that as much as 98 percent of Google Play’s own reve-
nue comes from in-app purchases within free-to-download apps, particularly games. Id. Book sales would 
therefore need to account for nearly 20 percent of in-app purchases—if they fall into the category of in-app 
purchases at all—for Google to meet the 2 percent statutory threshold. 
 17. Spotify is a popular music-streaming service that allows users to listen to the music of their 
choice for no charge. See SPOTIFY, https://www.spotify.com/us/ (last visited Mar. 31, 2015). Like many 
free services online, Spotify makes money by advertising to these listeners. 
 18. See generally Chris Jay Hoofnagle & Jan Whittington, Free: Accounting for the Costs of the 
Internet’s Most Popular Price, 61 UCLA L. REV. 606 (2014) (describing this business model and its conse-
quences for consumer welfare). 
 19. See Paul Ohm, The Rise and Fall of Invasive ISP Surveillance, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 1417, 
1422 (2009) (“The ISP operates the network chokepoint—its computers stand between the user and the rest 
of the Internet—and from this privileged vantage point it has access to all of its users’ private communica-
tions.”). 
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Other third parties simply eavesdrop on our book-browsing activities, collect-
ing user data without playing an intermediary role. A user might ignorantly down-
load a third-party cookie that collected detailed records of her browsing activities, 
providing that party with an activity log comparable to that held by an ISP.20 Or a 
company might release an e-reader that wirelessly reported all its contents to the 
manufacturer. Assuming that the manufacturer stayed out of the business of selling 
books, it could ostensibly collect detailed records on its customers’ reading habits 
without qualifying as a book service.21 Without coverage as to parties like these—
parties whose very business model involves collecting and exploiting user data—
the Act would offer extraordinarily thin protection for the digital reading practices 
it aimed to cover. 
B. Gramm-Leach-Bliley’s Financial Privacy Rule 
The GLBA’s Financial Privacy Rule imposes nondisclosure obligations on fi-
nancial institutions like banks and credit card issuers. 22  Congress enacted this 
measure in 1999 in response to concerns that banks were abusing consumers’ per-
sonal information by selling it to telemarketers and other third parties.23 The Rule is 
a partial success insofar as it imposes new barriers against marketers who would 
like to subsume centralized records of our transaction histories, like our checking 
ledgers and our credit-card statements, into detailed consumer dossiers.24  
But industry-specific regulations targeted at financial institutions work well 
only so long as we can assume that only one’s bank or credit card issuer—or a con-
sumer reporting agency, which is subject to a separate industry-specific law in the 
Fair Credit Reporting Act 25—could maintain a detailed consumer profile. This 
                                                          
 
 20. See Hoofnagle & Whittington, supra note 18, at 627 (quoting a report from 2010 finding that 
“the nation’s 50 top websites on average installed 64 pieces of tracking technology onto the computers of 
visitors, usually with no warning”); Woodrow Hartzog, Chain-Link Confidentiality, 46 GA. L. REV. 657, 
680 (2012) (“Websites that use cookies, Web bugs, and other data collection technologies have access to a 
host of information, including comprehensive browsing and search histories, payment information, and 
contact information such as addresses, phone numbers, and e-mail addresses.”) (footnotes omitted). 
 21. See Ard, supra note 9, at 49 (contemplating the difficulties such a device might present).  
 22. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 6801-6809 (2012). Many commentators question the efficacy of the law in 
practice given that few consumers read the notices required under the law or exercise the opt-out rights the 
law provides. See Edward J. Janger & Paul M. Schwartz, The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Information Priva-
cy, and the Limits of Default Rules, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1219, 1220 (2002). One need not be paranoid to 
wonder, for example, how a credit card issuer like Capital One exercises the option it has reserved to share 
personal information for “nonaffiliates to market to you,” where “nonaffiliates” expressly include “insur-
ance companies, service providers, co-branded partners, retailers, data processors, and advertisers.” See 
Capital One, What Does Capital One® Do With Your Personal Information? (Feb. 2013 revision), availa-
ble at www.capitalone.com/identity-protection/privacy/?nojs. But assessment of how the law works in 
practice is beyond the scope of this essay, which focuses on shortcomings that become apparent even if we 
limit our examination to the law’s formal coverage. 
 23. See H.R. REP. NO. 106-434, at 171 (1999) (Conf. Rep.). 
 24. For an introduction to the privacy issues that dossiers like these pose, see Daniel J. Solove, 
Digital Dossiers and the Dissipation of Fourth Amendment Privacy, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1083, 1095 (2002) 
(“[D]igital dossiers are increasingly becoming digital biographies, a horde of aggregated bits of information 
combined to reveal a portrait of who we are based upon what we buy, the organizations we belong to, how 
we navigate the Internet, and which shows and videos we watch.”).  
 25. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681(a). 
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might have been a fair assumption in an earlier decade, when the expense required 
to maintain the transaction history for a given credit card, link the card to a specific 
person, and track down her mailing address was too much to bear without the assis-
tance of the credit card company. In some instances state law even operated to keep 
these costs high. California’s Song-Beverly Credit Card Act of 1971, for example, 
attempts to thwart unwanted marketing by barring retailers from collecting personal 
identifiers such as zip codes as a condition of accepting a credit-card payment.26  
The roadblocks imposed by the GLBA are all but irrelevant in the twenty-first 
century, however, given that the declining costs of computing have enabled retail-
ers to construct elaborate consumer profiles by directly monitoring their customers’ 
shopping habits.27 Target, for example, employs algorithms that identify shoppers 
whose purchases indicate pregnancy and then mails them baby-related coupons.28 
This practice has become (in)famous for outing an expectant teen to her own father 
before she made the decision to share the news.29  
Retailers and advertisers also leverage modern networking technologies to 
pool their information and scour public records to draw inferences that might not be 
apparent from a customer’s purchases at any one store. The sharing arrangements 
have borne disquieting fruit. Grieving father Mike Seay once received a marketing 
letter from OfficeMax addressed to “Mike Seay, Daughter Killed in Car Crash.”30 
OfficeMax subsequently explained that this mailer was the result of “information 
they unintentionally bought from a third party data broker.”31 A closer look at the 
sorts of lists available for purchase reveals that people have been grouped into cat-
egories touching on the most intimate details of personal life, ranging from lists of 
people who take Prozac to survivors of rape and AIDS patients.32 Others group 
people by their religion (lists of persons who believe in the Bible), ethnicity (“Af-
fluent Hispanics”), or sexuality (“the Gay America Megafile”).33 
This is not to single retailers out for derision. The roles that different indus-
tries play in the creation of dossiers like these is obscure, and deliberately so. Firms 
                                                          
 
 26. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1747.08 (West 2012); Pineda v. Williams-Sonoma Stores, Inc., 246 P.3d 
612 (Cal. 2011). But see Apple, Inc. v. Superior Court, 292 P.3d 883 (Cal. 2013) (rejecting the application 
of the law to online transactions). 
 27. See Harry Surden, Structural Rights in Privacy, 60 SMU L. REV. 1605, 1617 (2007) (“Since 
structural constraints employ costs and barriers to regulate, anything that tends to reduce these costs or 
undermine these barriers significantly reduces their regulatory effectiveness.”). 
 28. FRANK PASQUALE, THE BLACK BOX SOCIETY: THE SECRET ALGORITHMS THAT CONTROL 
MONEY AND INFORMATION 28–29 (2015); Omer Tene & Jules Polonetsky, A Theory of Creepy: Technolo-
gy, Privacy, and Shifting Social Norms, 16 YALE J. L. & TECH. 59, 66–68 (2013) (“Target assigns custom-
ers a pregnancy prediction score, which is based on their purchase habits, in order to beat its competitors in 
identifying a precious moment when shopping habits are most amenable to change—the birth of a baby.”). 
 29. See PASQUALE, supra note 28, at 29. 
 30. See Kashmir Hill, OfficeMax Blames Data Broker for ‘Daughter Killed in Car Crash’ Let-
ter, FORBES (Jan. 22, 2014, 12:09 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/kashmirhill/2014/01/22/officemax-
blames-data-broker-for-daughter-killed-in-car-crash-letter/. 
 31. Id. 
 32. See Daniel Keats Citron & Frank Pasquale, The Scored Society: Due Process for Automated 
Predictions, 89 WASH. L. REV. 1, 22 (2014); Joshua L. Simmons, Buying You: The Government’s Use of 
Fourth-Parties to Launder Data About “The People,” 2009 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 950, 991 (2009). 
 33. See DANIEL SOLOVE, THE DIGITAL PERSON 22 (2004); Simmons, supra note 32, at 991.  
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share the intuition that customers would not approve of these practices and (ironi-
cally) bind the recipients of customer information to keep their sources secret.34 
The point here is that regulation of privacy in consumer transactions defies any 
approach that regulates a single industry, whether it be banking or retail. This at-
mosphere of obscurity, moreover, makes it difficult for consumers and regulators to 
track the data flows or hold the relevant actors accountable.  
III. CHALLENGES OF E-COMMERCE 
A. Rapid Change 
The Internet raises three challenges for the industry-specific approach. The 
first arises from the rapid turnover of firms online.35 For better or worse, the Inter-
net has heralded a disruptive cycle that ushers new industries into the market while 
displacing the incumbents.36 New entrants might take on the portfolios of older 
players, as Google and other search engines have supplanted libraries in answering 
reference questions. Or they might engage in collection and disclosure practices 
with no direct precedent, like advertising networks’ use of cookies to monitor a 
user’s browsing patterns across the Internet. Without some mechanism to expand 
privacy commitments to new industries on a regular basis, industry-specific laws 
have become particularly prone to obsolescence in the digital age. 
B. Pervasive Intermediation 
The second challenge arises from the intermediation of online activity. Sup-
pose that Maxwell and Pete want to purchase hammers. In the pre-digital world 
Maxwell might go to Sears and purchase his hammer directly. Only Maxwell and 
Sears would be privy to this one-to-one transaction. Even if Maxwell placed his 
order by phone, moreover, the telephone and delivery service would not typically 
know the content of the transaction. Putting their heads together, they would only 
know that Maxwell called Sears and subsequently received a package weighing 
about 16 ounces.  
If Pete bought his hammer online, he would expose the details of his transac-
tion to a much larger cast of characters. Even if Pete went directly to sears.com, he 
                                                          
 
 34. PASQUALE, supra note 28, at 145. 
 35. This challenge is a version of the “pacing problem” that scholars like Gary Marchant have 
identified, whereby the “growing gap between the pace of technology and law” results in “increasingly 
outdated and ineffective legal structures, institutions and processes to regulate emerging technologies.” 
Gary E. Marchant, The Growing Gap Between Emerging Technologies and the Law, in THE GROWING GAP 
BETWEEN EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES AND LEGAL-ETHICAL OVERSIGHT: THE PACING PROBLEM 19, 19 
(Gary E. Marchant, Braden R. Allenby & Joseph R. Herkert eds. 2011); see also Lyria Bennett Moses, 
Recurring Dilemmas: The Law’s Race To Keep Up with Technological Change, 2007 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & 
POL’Y 239, 264–69 (2007) (explaining how technological change can render laws obsolete). 
 36. See, e.g., CLAYTON M. CHRISTENSEN, THE INNOVATOR’S DILEMMA: WHEN NEW 
TECHNOLOGIES CAUSE GREAT FIRMS TO FAIL (rev. ed. 1997) (developing the idea of “disruptive innova-
tion”); id. at xxvi (“Not surprisingly, the Internet looms as an infrastructural technology that is enabling the 
disruption of many industries.”); see also Neal Katyal, Disruptive Technologies and the Law, 102 GEO. L.J. 
1685, 1685 (2014).  
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would encounter the ubiquitous “share” buttons for Facebook, Twitter, and 
Google+.37 Buttons like these often embed code that allows sites like Facebook to 
monitor their users’ activities regardless of whether they actually click the button.38 
These forms of surveillance are joined by more invasive cookies that monitor 
browsing activity without the need for a button embedded on the page, to say noth-
ing of the constant flow of data to one’s ISP.39 The web would grow even more 
tangled if Pete began with a Google search (“If I had a hammer…”) rather than 
going directly to Sears. Google would then be able to add this query to Pete’s 
search history. More surprisingly for Pete, if Pete followed Google’s link to Sears 
then Google would tell Sears exactly what search query Pete had entered.40 
Setting aside for the moment our concerns with targeted advertisements, we 
might not lose sleep over a world where dozens of third parties knew we wanted to 
purchase a hammer. Where these forms of intermediation characterize the majority 
of our online experience, however, we have reason to be concerned that industry-
specific laws may fail to vindicate privacy commitments that we hold quite dear. 
We might be troubled, for example, by our loss of intellectual privacy when li-
brary- or bookseller-centric laws did nothing to prevent legions of intermediaries 
from learning and disclosing what we have read.41 We might likewise be concerned 
about the loss of health privacy that would follow if search engines and advertise-
ment networks could freely eavesdrop as we searched for information on an embar-
rassing rash or for the number to a suicide prevention hotline. The intermediation 
and surveillance characteristic of electronic commerce beggars any regulatory ap-
proach premised on the regulation of specific entities engaged in neat one-on-one 
transactions.42 
C. Obscurity of Surveillance 
The third challenge lies in the relative obscurity of these third parties. A rea-
sonably savvy user might intuit that Google tracked one’s search history and 
scanned one’s Gmail messages or that the Washington Post kept a log of which 
stories the user had read.43 The user might even understand—albeit dimly—that 
Google or the Washington Post retained the option under its privacy policy to dis-
                                                          
 
 37. SEARS, http://www.sears.com/ (last visited Mar. 31, 2015) (search for “hammer” and browse 
the resulting links). 
 38. Riva Richmond, As ‘Like’ Buttons Spread, So Do Facebook’s Tentacles, N.Y. TIMES: BITS 
BLOG (Sept. 27, 2011, 3:51 PM), http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/09/27/as-like-buttonsspread-so-do-
facebooks-tentacles/. 
 39. See supra notes 19–20 and accompanying text. 
 40. See Hoofnagle & Whittington, supra note 18, at 643 (“[R]eferrer headers indicate infor-
mation about users’ intentions, and in the case of Google, they often reveal the specific search string entered 
by the user.”).  
 41. See sources cited supra note 8 (articulating the importance of intellectual privacy for person-
al development and the advancement of public discourse).  
 42. Cf. Krug, supra note 5, at 2044 (developing a similar critique of entity-centric regulations in 
consumer finance). 
 43. The Washington Post comes to mind because of its early deployment of a “social reader” 
app, which automatically posted the user’s reading history to her Facebook News Feed, often without the 
user’s knowledge. See Neil M. Richards, The Perils of Social Reading, 101 GEO. L.J. 689, 713–714 (2013). 
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close the records to third parties.44 That user might be quite surprised to learn that 
the site had invited several third-party sites to directly observe the user’s activi-
ties.45 Add to these the invisible third parties the user might bring in the form of 
tracking cookies installed from elsewhere.46 Users are hard pressed to regulate their 
own disclosures when they do not know who is surveilling them. Lawmakers, for 
their part, can hardly respond to activities that are invisible to them and to their 
constituencies. 
* * * 
Collectively these features of electronic commerce increase not only the pub-
lic burden of firms’ data collection practices but also the complexity of lawmaking. 
The increased burden is relatively easy to see. Where changed business practices 
render laws obsolete, the public does not receive the intended benefit of the laws. 
Where the surveillance itself is opaque—as surveillance by intermediaries often 
is—members of the public may also lose privacy by disclosing facts they would 
have withheld had they known who was really watching. 
Lawmaking is made more difficult because the public faces challenges in or-
ganizing around rapidly changing, technically dense, and largely invisible issues of 
surveillance. Public choice theory predicts that a minority bloc with concentrated 
interests (like firms who benefit from lax privacy regulation) will often wield more 
political influence than a majority with more diffuse interests (like the general pub-
lic that would favor expanded privacy protection).47 As Neil Komesar argues, one 
factor that works in favor of more concentrated interest groups is their greater ac-
cess to information concerning what’s at stake.48 The more complex or obscure the 
disputed practice, the less likely it is that those with more diffuse interests will be 
able to understand the impact of the practice on their own lives, much less to mobi-
                                                          
 
 44. Any such understanding would be attenuated, however, by the privacy policies’ lack of de-
tail regarding the identities or number of third parties implicated. See Clark D. Asay, Consumer Information 
Privacy and the Problem(s) of Third-Party Disclosures, 11 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 321, 324 (2013) 
(arguing that “consumers receive little to no information about who specifically will receive their infor-
mation and how they will use it”). 
 45. As one correspondent at the Washington Post explained: 
When your browser landed on this article, it didn't just talk to the friendly servers at washing-
tonpost.com. It also made contact with Chartbeat, a company that helps us understand where 
else you've been on the Web, and how you're interacting with the site. Your browser also 
connected to a personalized news applet called Trove, various marketing plug-ins and a social 
bookmarking service run by a company known as AddThis. 
Brian Fung, Who Tracks the Trackers that Track You Online? You Can, with Lightbeam, WASH. POST: THE 
SWITCH (Oct. 30, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-switch/wp/2013/10/30/who-tracks-the-
trackers-that-track-you-online-you-can-with-lightbeam/. 
 46. See supra note 20 and accompanying text. 
 47. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 
1479, 1530 (1987) (articulating public choice theory’s prediction that legislatures will pass few laws that 
benefit the general public “because they rarely stimulate the formation of supportive interest groups”). 
 48. NEIL K. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS IN LAW, 
ECONOMICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY 71–73 (1994). 
616 IDAHO LAW REVIEW [VOL. 51 
 
 
lize a campaign to advance their interests.49 Rapid shifts in business practices, the 
unprecedented complexity hidden below the surface of simple transactions, and the 
general invisibility of data collection and disclosure online therefore raise the costs 
of political action and threaten to sap popular will for new privacy laws. These 
added difficulties for political action are troubling given how rapidly an industry-
specific regime can fall into obsolescence without new and revised laws. 
IV. BEYOND INDUSTRY-SPECIFIC LAW 
The preceding discussion has outlined the challenges that the Internet poses 
for industry-specific privacy laws and industry-specific approaches to privacy law. 
While it is beyond the scope of this essay to offer a comprehensive alternative par-
adigm, the following sections outline three avenues for further consideration: the 
translation of industry-specific laws to transaction-centered regimes; enhanced 
transparency; and increased reliance on agencies and other institutions equipped to 
respond to rapid change.  
A. Transaction-Centered Interventions 
Many industry-specific privacy laws could be translated into terms that were 
industry-neutral but transaction-specific. In other words, lawmakers could define a 
law’s scope by reference to the kinds of activity they wished to regulate rather than 
by reference to the industry currently conducting that activity. 
Some laws have already achieved this result. Take the Fair Credit Reporting 
Act (“FCRA”). On its face it looks like an industry-specific law: it covers only 
“consumer reporting agencies.”50 But tracing the definitions provided by the Act 
reveals that a “credit reporting agency” includes anyone in the practice of furnish-
ing reports for the purpose of establishing a consumer’s eligibility for credit, insur-
ance, or employment.51 This open-ended definition provided the basis for an FTC 
action against Spokeo, a “people search” website, for collecting consumers’ infor-
mation from social media sites and selling it to prospective employers without ad-
hering to the Act.52 Any party who engages in the targeted transaction—providing 
reports used to evaluate someone’s credit or employability—must accordingly be 
mindful of the FCRA. 
                                                          
 
 49. See id. at 71 (“[O]ne important form of information is the basic recognition of the existence 
of an interest. . . . The more complex the social issue the more difficult or expensive it is to recognize one’s 
position.”). 
 50. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681b (2012) (“[A]ny consumer reporting agency may furnish a consumer 
report under the following circumstances and no other . . . .”). 
 51. See id. § 1681a(f) (defining “consumer reporting agency” as one engaged in the practice of 
“furnishing consumer reports to third parties”); id. § 1681a(c) (defining “consumer report” as any commu-
nication that is used or expected to be used in establishing eligibility for credit, insurance, or employment). 
 52. See Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Spokeo To Pay $800,000 To Settle FTC Charges 
Company Allegedly Marketed Information to Employers and Recruiters in Violation of FCRA (June 12, 
2012), available at https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2012/06/spokeo-pay-800000-settle-ftc-
charges-company-allegedly-marketed. 
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Laws can also be drafted to curtail surveillance by digital intermediaries. The 
GLBA Security Rule effectively excludes third parties from eavesdropping on bank 
transactions: it imposes on each financial institution a “continuing obligation . . . to 
protect the security and confidentiality of [its] customers’ nonpublic personal in-
formation” and authorizes agencies to establish security standards,53 including en-
cryption requirements that reduce the likelihood that financial records will leak to 
unauthorized intermediaries or eavesdroppers.54 The result is to make it quite diffi-
cult for intermediaries to intercept communications between the consumer and a 
financial institution. To make the point a bit more concrete: try to recall the last 
time you received a bank statement by e-mail as opposed to an invitation to view 
the statement on a secure website hosted by the bank. 
Short of excluding intermediaries from our transactions via security rules and 
encrypted communications, we could imagine transaction-centered privacy regimes 
that simply attached the same obligations to all parties to an online transaction, 
whether the party was the direct service provider, a facilitating intermediary, or an 
eavesdropping advertiser. Legislators might amend the CRPA, for example, to cov-
er all parties to a book sale or book-lending transaction rather than cover the book 
service alone.55 
Transaction-centered laws are well suited to preserve privacy commitments 
we have already adopted. Rapid turnover among businesses that provide the same 
basic service does not threaten a transaction-centered law with obsolescence. Nor 
does intermediation and eavesdropping. But transaction-centered approaches would 
not cover emergent data collection practices that lacked a clear connection to to-
day’s protected transactions. Other approaches, such as enhanced transparency, are 
needed to pave the way for future regulation. 
B. Enhanced Transparency 
Heightened visibility for commercial firms’ collection and disclosure practic-
es is an important first step towards the development of effective privacy laws. As 
it stands, the firms who have the greatest interest in perpetuating digital surveil-
lance also benefit from a practical monopoly on information about the scope and 
nature of these practices.56 The stage is therefore set for increasing private surveil-
lance while these practices escape public scrutiny. 
                                                          
 
 53. 15 U.S.C. § 6801. 
 54. See, e.g., Interagency Guidelines Establishing Info. Sec. Standards, 12 C.F.R. Pt. 30, app. B, 
Sec. III.C.1.c. (2014).  
 55. One might question the feasibility of requiring third parties like Internet service providers 
and search engines to treat traffic to or from book services differently than other traffic. But as a technical 
matter it would be relatively easy for the book service to signal to third parties that the information required 
special treatment. In one implementation, the book service could simply run a snippet of code during pro-
tected transactions—much like the industry-standard robot.txt file that sites already use to communicate 
their indexing preferences to search engines, see Field v. Google, 412 F. Supp. 2d 1106, 1113 (D. Nev. 
2006) (“The Internet industry has widely recognized the robots.txt file as a standard for controlling auto-
mated access to Web pages since 1994.”)—indicating that CRPA protections apply. 
 56. See supra notes 47–49 and accompanying text (explaining how informational advantages 
can translate into political advantages). 
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Right now the primary window into firms’ data practices lies in their privacy 
policies, though practically no one reads them.57 Even in a counterfactual world 
where everyone read these terms, however, the public would remain poorly in-
formed about how their data was actually being handled. Firms often reserve the 
right to disclose information to some set of third parties but they seldom identify 
who these parties are or how many are involved.58 Even the diligent user, therefore, 
has little visibility into whether the firm intends to share information with one or 
two close partners, to disclose it indiscriminately to a dozen loose associates, or to 
sell personal data wholesale to a data aggregator who intends to repackage and re-
sell the data to anyone willing to pay.59 
One set of transparency-enhancing interventions would accordingly focus on 
making the chain of disclosures more visible. At present many firms bind the 
downstream recipients of user data to strict confidentiality.60 We could imagine a 
regime where these firms were required instead to carefully log the chain of custo-
dy for any data they transmitted. These obligations could be made viral, so that 
each firm in the chain of transmission had to make a record of who else received 
the data.61 Like the privacy policies themselves, the resulting logs might be impene-
trable to the average user. But they would lower the costs of investigation and ac-
tion by Congress, the Federal Trade Commission, and public advocacy groups.62 
Another set of interventions might focus on making the initial collection of 
data both visible and salient. 63  Where written disclosures fail to communicate 
what’s going on, Ryan Calo argues for the deployment of “visceral notice.”64 Just 
as cameras (and camera apps) can be designed to announce their presence by mak-
ing an audible shutter sound, Calo argues that web interfaces can be designed in 
ways that would alert the user to ongoing surveillance.65 For example, “each adver-
tising network on the Internet [could have] an avatar that ran onto the bottom of the 
                                                          
 
 57. It’s doubtful that we could find the time even if we tried: Aleecia McDonald and Lorrie 
Cranor estimate that it would have taken the average Internet user 244 hours to read all the privacy policies 
she encountered in the year 2008 alone. Aleecia M. McDonald & Lorrie Faith Cranor, The Cost of Reading 
Privacy Policies, 4 I/S: J.L. & POL’Y FOR INFO. SOC’Y 543, 560 (2008). 
 58. See Asay, supra note 44, at 324. 
 59. Because this lack of visibility insulates the firm from consumer scrutiny, it may also increase 
the likelihood that the firm will choose the most profitable option regardless of its impacts on consumer 
privacy. See Paul M. Schwartz, Property, Privacy, and Personal Data, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2055, 2080–82 
(2004) (explaining how the market for privacy policies can devolve into one for lemons when consumers 
lack the ability to compare the quality of terms). 
 60. See supra note 34 and accompanying text. 
 61. Cf. Hartzog, supra note 20, at 695–96 (proposing the use of contracts to bind downstream 
recipients of user information to a set of confidentiality obligations as well as an obligation to perpetuate the 
contractual chain in any future disclosures). 
 62. See KOMESAR, supra note 48, at 71 (emphasizing the role that information costs play in the 
success of political organizing). 
 63. These interventions would be particularly helpful in cases where third parties obtained in-
formation not via downstream disclosures, but by insinuating themselves into the initial transaction as in-
termediaries or eavesdroppers. 
 64. See generally M. Ryan Calo, Against Notice Skepticism in Privacy (and Elsewhere), 87 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1027 (2013). 
 65. See id. at 1034–41. 
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screen to denote the fact that the network was following the user.”66 Better yet, Ca-
lo suggests the interface could be designed so that users could click on these ava-
tars to exercise their opt-out rights. 67  The psychological response to feeling 
“watched” by these avatars—a common response to anthropomorphic designs68—
could trigger the sort of visceral notice that would help people to understand the 
actual scope of surveillance in their daily lives. 69  Like other transparency-
enhancing interventions, visceral notice could reduce the burdens of organizing—
whether in the market or in politics—by making information easier to acquire. 
C. Responsive Lawmaking 
Conventional privacy legislation—industry-specific or not—may struggle to 
keep pace with the rapid change and technical complexity of digital surveillance.70 
Commentators have long criticized Congress in matters of privacy for being “both 
reactive and slow to react.”71 And some argue, in light of contemporary deadlock, 
that Congress has devolved into a “vetocracy” where special interests can co-opt 
the system to block legislation even in the face of majority support.72 These issues 
counsel in favor of looking beyond Congress for privacy law’s continued develop-
ment. 
The search for more responsive institutions offers new perspectives on two 
trends in privacy law: agency delegation and state legislation. As Daniel Solove 
and Woodrow Hartzog have recognized, the FTC has become the de facto regulator 
in all matters of privacy.73 Its transaction-focused regulatory mandate—to police 
against “unfair or deceptive acts”74—has given it the flexibility to fill the gaps be-
tween our industry-specific privacy statutes. 75  Its growing substantive expertise 
with Internet privacy, moreover, equip it to cut through the complexity and obfus-
cation of cyberspace in ways that generalist legislators cannot. The FTC’s agility 
                                                          
 
 66. Id. at 1040. 
 67. Id. 
 68. See id. at 1038–39. 
 69. Mozilla’s Lightbeam add-on offers a model on which to build such an intervention. 
Lightbeam provides interactive visualizations showing the various sites—including hidden third parties—
that one has encountered while browsing the web. See Fung, supra note 45; see also Lightbeam for Firefox, 
MOZILLA.ORG, http://www.mozilla.org/en-US/lightbeam/ (last visited Mar. 31, 2015). 
 70. Cf. Marchant, supra note 35.  
 71. Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Toward a Positive Theory of Privacy Law, 126 HARV. L. REV. 2010, 
2012 (2013). 
 72. See Sanford Levinson, How I Lost My Constitutional Faith, 71 MD. L. REV. 956, 957–58 
(2012) (criticizing the “vetocratic” features of our government). 
 73. See Daniel J. Solove & Woodrow Hartzog, The FTC and the New Common Law of Privacy, 
114 COLUM. L. REV. 583, 588 (2014) (arguing that “FTC regulation is . . . the largest and arguably the most 
important component of the U.S. privacy regulatory system.”); Lauren Henry, Note, Institutionally Appro-
priate Approaches to Privacy: Striking a Balance Between Judicial and Administrative Enforcement of 
Privacy Law, 51 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 193, 210 (2014) (“The FTC is well suited to handle data privacy con-
flicts that involve balancing the interests of many stakeholders because of its expertise in data privacy, 
ability to do independent research and adapt quickly to changing customs and technology, and custom of 
providing tailored solutions through consent orders.”). 
 74.  15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(2) (2012). 
 75.  Solove & Hartzog, supra note 73, at 588. 
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relative to Congress provides an additional yardstick to measure its apparent suc-
cess in addressing the distinct challenges posed by the Internet and other new tech-
nologies. 
Congress might also find new ways to leverage the FTC’s speed and expertise 
in this space. While Congress may lack the capacity to update legislation to keep 
pace with the latest developments in e-commerce, it could pass transaction-centric 
laws and delegate authority to the FTC to more carefully tailor the regime to par-
ticular industries as needed. A system like this could combine the coverage of 
transaction-centered law with the grounded specificity of industry-specific law. To 
avoid overtaxing its own resources, the FTC could require regulated industries to 
bear the burden of persuasion in seeking any special accommodations. This ap-
proach would have the advantage of requiring the regulating party—as the one with 
better information about its own business practices—to disclose the distinctive fea-
tures of its business model to regulators. By opening any such proceedings to pub-
lic scrutiny, moreover, the FTC could enlist the industry’s competitors in monitor-
ing against abuse of the system. Given that any industry that gained an exemption 
would wield a competitive advantage, competitors who could not benefit from the 
exemption would be motivated to voice their objections.76 
State legislatures deserve attention as another set of institutions that are more 
responsive than Congress. Paul Schwartz has famously argued that we ought to 
leave room for the states to regulate privacy so that we can capture the benefits of 
state-level experimentation between alternative privacy regimes.77 We might also 
look to state actors because the states have proven themselves to be more active 
than Congress in updating their privacy regimes to account for changed circum-
stances. In recent years states have enacted new privacy legislation in matters as 
disparate as e-readers, drones, and cellphone tracking. 78  As California’s CRPA 
demonstrates, state laws offer no panacea—industry-specific lawmaking is just one 
of the pitfalls that might limit their effectiveness. The recent flurry of activity none-
theless sets the stage for serious scholarly investigation of the states’ competence, 
relative to federal actors, in keeping pace with emerging surveillance practices. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The industry-specific approach to privacy lawmaking is a poor fit for Internet 
surveillance. We can bolster many existing laws by translating them into industry-
neutral, transaction-centered terms. But the greater challenge lies in identifying 
                                                          
 
 76. Cf. Schwartz, supra note 1, at 924 (“A sectoral law might create competitive disadvantages 
for companies that fall under it and a corresponding subsidy to those outside of its reach.”). 
 77.  See id. at 932; see also Margot E. Kaminski, Drone Federalism: Civilian Drones and the 
Things They Carry, 4 CALIF. L. REV. CIRCUIT 57, 65–66 (2013) (endorsing state development of drone 
privacy laws). 
 78.  See, e.g., Kaminski, supra note 77, at 59 & n.11 (documenting state efforts to regulate drone 
privacy); Hanni Fakhoury, Why Wait for Congress? States Passing Electronic Privacy Legislation, ELEC. 
FRONTIER FOUND. (June 3, 2013), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2013/05/why-wait-congress-states-
passing-electronic-privacy-legislation (documenting recent state bills to extend privacy protections over 
emails and cellphone location tracking); see also Part I.A, supra (describing California’s new reader priva-
cy law). 
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approaches to lawmaking that can generate effective new laws in the face of the 
rapid change, technical complexity, and sheer uncertainty that surround technolo-
gies and business practices online. As a start, this essay proposes that we find new 
ways to equip the public to play an informed role in privacy lawmaking and that we 
continue to explore opportunities for regulation by highly responsive institutions 
like the FTC. 
